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Abstract. We evaluate how vulnerable the emerging markets are to sudden stops, that is, 
capital inflow reversals, using panel data for 12 emerging economies for the period 1976-
2002 that experienced such reversals. We investigate the impact of sudden stops on the 
macroeconomic indicators of economic growth and investment by employing the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation methodology. A robustness check is 
performed using regional groups and introducing additional control variables. We find that 
sudden stops have lagging, negative, and robust effect on output and investment, while the 
effect on investment is not always robusth. 
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1. Introduction 
he first major wave of financial globalization occurred in 1860–1914; 
Obstfeld & Taylor (2001) identify the second in the last three to four 
decades of the twentieth century, which peaked in the 1990s.  Financial 
globalization makes sudden stops, Calvo’s (1998) term for capital inflow reversals, 
a key feature of the world economy during the 1990s, when many emerging 
countries experienced the phenomenon. When countries have high capital mobility, 
sudden stops of capital inflows occur frequently and can be highly disruptive. 
As Calvo (1998) and later Calvo, Izquierdo, & Talvi (2006) explain, a country 
experiences a sudden stop when the annual flow of international capital reduces by 
more than two standard deviations from the mean flow, while the spike in the 
aggregate Emerging Market Bond Index spread exceeds two standard deviations 
from its mean over the year. When accompanying substantial collapses in bank 
credit and the current account deficit, sudden stops tend to result in macroeconomic 
crises such as output collapse, banking crisis, and widespread corporate and 
household bankruptcies. Sudden stops may severely affect investment, one of the 
immediate indicators associated with the capital market, because an interaction 
between systemic capital market forces and domestic financial vulnerabilities 
typically trigger them (Calvo et al. 2004; Calvo & Talvi, 2005). 
Severe incidents of sudden stops began to affect emerging market economies in 
the 1980s. They have become larger over time, and, as that would suggest, have a 
larger impact on the economy as a whole. As Calvo, Izquierdo, & Talvi (2006) 
indicate, certain country-specific vulnerabilities determine the impact, such as the 
extent to which a particular country’s currency is linked to the dollar. Sula’s (2010) 
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empirical investigation of 38 emerging market economies between 1990 and 2003 
shows that the probability of a sudden stop increased between these dates because 
of the surge in capital inflows. Further, economies with a high current account 
deficit or an appreciated real exchange rate experience particular vulnerability 
because the capital inflow consists of private loans and portfolio flows rather than 
direct investment. Those factors are quite prevalent in emerging market economies. 
Mishiki (1999) argues that institutional features of debt market primarily drive the 
greater severity of financial crises in emerging market economies compared with 
industrialized countries, while the pegged exchange-rate regimes, weak prudential 
supervision of the banking system, and impetuous financial liberalization are 
secondary causes. 
As Calvo (1998) indicates, economic collapse in emerging markets leads to 
sharp recession, high unemployment, and soaring rates of poverty. Mexico’s 
Tequila Crisis (1994), the Asian crisis (1997) and the Russian crisis (1998) were all 
triggered by sudden stops, which hurt economic growth in the affected economies 
deeply. 
The sudden stop that precipitated the Tequila Crisis largely occurred because of 
tightening monetary policy in the United States and political instability in Mexico. 
The Mexican government devalued its currency by approximately 50 percent in 
December 1994, causing a fear of government default by foreign investors, which 
led them to cease investing in the country, creating a capital inflow reversal. The 
financial crisis spread to the Southern Cone and other developing countries. 
Investors placed a higher risk premium on Mexican assets, which made interest 
rates in Mexico increase rapidly. As the costs of borrowing became higher, many 
borrowers who had loans from commercial banks or foreigners defaulted on their 
debt, hurting the banking system and economic growth. Mexico experienced its 
largest one-year output decline in 1995,a decline of more than six percent. In 
addition, hyperinflation made real wages shrink by 25-35 percent. Unemployment 
rate almost doubled from 3.9 percent to 7.4 percent, and more than one million 
people lost their jobs. Extreme poverty grew to 37 percent in 1996 from 21 percent 
in 1994, reversing impressive gains in poverty reduction in the previous ten years, 
and the poverty levels did not return to their pre-recession level until 2001.1 
Sudden stops always lead to output collapse. Mendoza (2010) shows that 
sudden stops are also associated with plummeting GDP growth, consumption, and 
investment and that those indicators recover slowly over the course of years. By 
contrast, Calvo, Izquierdo, & Talvi (2006) argue that emerging markets can rise 
quickly from their own ashes after sudden stops, despite large output collapse, even 
when credit and capital inflows do not cover and investment recovery remains 
weak. They argue that the economic activity in countries affected by sudden stops 
reaches pre-crisis levels in less than three years on average, based on total factor 
productivity. 
Joyce (2009) argues that collapse in investment associated with sudden stops 
has negative impact on economic growth in emerging market countries in the long 
run; he argues the phoenix-like recovery of output growth in these countries masks 
the consequence of persistently low even output. Specifically, he indicates that 
output recovery without investment can compromise the robustness of the 
recovery. Data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator support 
Joyce’s (2009) results. In East Asia following the Asian Crisis that began in 1997, 
output recovered quickly but the investment to GDP ratio took much longer. In 
Indonesia, GDP growth plummeted sharply from 7.82 percent in 1996 to -13.13 
percent in 1998, and was still at 4.92 percent in 2000. The drop in the investment to 
GDP ratio, from more than 30 percent before the crisis to 16.8 percent in 1998 and 
11.4 percent in 1999, did not recover until 2009. GDP growth fell from 5.90 
 
1  Pereznieto, Paola (2010), The Case of Mexico's 1995 Peso Crisis and Argentina's 2002 
Convertibility Crisis: Including Children in Policy Responses to Previous Economic Crises, 
UNICEF Working Paper 
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percent in 1996 in Thailand to -10.51 percent in 1998, and recovered to 4.45 in 
1999. However, the investment to GDP ratio declined by almost half in the crisis 
and had not returned to the pre-crisis level in 2016, the latest available data.2 
In this paper, we examine the impact of sudden stops on both the GDP growth 
and investment of 12 emerging economies between 1976 and 2002. We account for 
the possibility that sudden stops have lagging effect on output and investment and 
we apply Arellano & Bond’s (1991) dynamic panel GMM estimation procedure to 
address the concern that sudden stops and shrinkage of GDP growth are likely to 
have a simultaneous causality issue and accordingly the estimation of this dynamic 
panel has a bias.  
Multiple control variables are applied to help explain the converging or 
distracted impacts on the dependent variables. We use government consumption 
and human capital, and other necessary determinants of economic growth, as 
control variables in the regression for GDP growth. Lagged GDP growth, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) to GDP ratio, debt service (measured by debt service to 
GDP ratio) and real interest rate, are also employed as control variables. Because 
the performance of output is usually associated with investment in emerging 
markets, and output growth in the previous year also lays a foundation for future 
investment, we apply the two variables as control variables to each other in the 
regressions. We check the robustness by setting up regional groups and adding 
variables. 
The results in this paper support an understanding that sudden stops in emerging 
market economies have a negative impact on both output and investment. They 
also show that these effects lag. Previous theoretical and empirical studies tend to 
focus on the impact of sudden stops on output. Our study confirms previous 
research work in this area that investment should not be ignored. However, the 
impact of investment is not always robust and also sometimes varies across the 
region. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II depicts the data used in this paper. 
Section III explains the methodology applied in the context. Section IV presents 
the impact of sudden stops on GDP growth and investment, employing dynamic 
panel GMM methodology. Section V divides the countries into regional groups and 
introduces new control variables, then describes the results of robustness tests. 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data 
The paper uses panel data for sudden stops identified in Calvo (2003) between 
1976 and 2002 identified among 12 emerging economies: Argentina, Chile, 
Ecuador, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Venezuela, South 
Korea, Thailand and Turkey. We focus on economic growth and investment. 
Defining sudden stops as a dummy variable, valued at one if in a given year the 
country suffered from sudden stops and zero otherwise, we will run a set of 
regressions to analyze the impact on the dependent variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Source: World Development Indicator by World Bank 
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Table 1. Sudden Stops distribution 
Country Episode SS (percentage of GDP) 
Argentina 1982-83 20 
Argentina 1994-95 4 
Chile 1981-83 7 
Chile 1990-91 8 
Ecuador 1995-96 19 
Hungary 1995-96 7 
Indonesia 1996-97 5 
Malaysia 1993-94 15 
Mexico 1981-83 12 
Mexico 1993-95 6 
Philippines 1996-97 7 
Venezuala 1992-94 9 
Korea 1996-97 11 
Thailand 1996-97 26 
Thailand 1993-94 10 
Source: Calvo & Reinhart (2000) from World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues; and Institute 
for International Economics, Comparative Statistics for Emerging Market Economies, 1998. 
 
Table 2. Data Definitions and Sources 
Name Definition Source 
SS dummy variable takes 1 if there is a sudden stop in country i at the time t, 
0 otherwise 
Calvo 
(1998) 
GDPgrowth gross domestic product, real, percent IMFIFS 
investmentGDP gross capital formation  (% of GDP) growth WDI 
inflation inflation, change of consumer prices (annual %) WDI 
TradeGDP trade  (% of GDP) WDI 
FDIGDP foreign direct investment  (% of GDP) WDI 
debtserviceGDP total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) WDI 
STdebtratio short-term debt (% of total external debt) WDI 
InterestRate real interest rate (%) WDI 
GOVConGDP general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WDI 
HumanCapital gross enrolment raio, secondary, both sexes (%) WDI 
 
To control the effects of omitted variables, we tend to include other 
determinants of each dependent variable by consulting empirical literatures. For 
economic growth, the main control variables are government purchase, investment, 
and human capital. All of these variables are directly associated with output 
growth. For investment, the main control variables are lagged GDP growth, interest 
rate, FDI, and debt service, in which the lagged GDP growth and FDI affect 
investment positively, while interest rate and debt service function negatively. The 
macroeconomic data were obtained from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators, supplemented by the IMF's International Financial Statistics and from 
other empirical literatures. 
 
3. Estimation methodology 
In our basic model, the dependent variables are determined by: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +𝛾𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝛼𝑖+𝛿𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑗=1        (1) 
 
where X is the matrix of control variables for each dependent variable, SS is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there is a sudden stop in country i at the 
time t, 𝛼𝑖  is country fixed effect, 𝛿𝑡  is a vector of year dummies, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error 
term.  
The existing empirical literature suggests that both economic growth and 
investment display persistence which calls for the lagged dependent variable on the 
right-hand side through a partial adjustment mechanism. To address this concern, 
we employ the GMM methodology, including both the difference GMM and 
system GMM. The sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the dummy 
variable will be used and compared to explain the impact of sudden stops in each 
estimation. Results of a Sargan test and an AB test will show if the model is 
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correctly specified and there is no serial correlation in the error term of higher-
order.  
Finally, we will test for the robustness of the results by dividing the data into 
sub-samples across regions and introduce additional control variables to rule out 
the possibility that the dummy is acting as a proxy for the influence of other 
incentives to economic growth and investment.  
 
4. Estimation results 
The existing empirical literature suggests that both economic growth and 
investment display persistence, which is evident through the lagged dependent 
variable on the right-hand side through a partial adjustment mechanism. Especially 
for times-series dominant data, the value of an outcome variable from the previous 
period has a big influence on the dependent variable over the value of the outcome 
variable in the current period. However, by introducing a lagged dependent 
variable, we enable a demeaning process that creates a correlation problem 
between regressors and the error term. To solve this issue, we use further lags of 
the dependent variable as instrument variables as proxies of lag dependent 
variables by implementing Arellano Bond “Difference GMM” and Arellano 
Bond/Blundell-Bond “System GMM” techniques. 
We firstly assume that all regressors are strictly exogenous and run the 
difference GMM. Therefore the only variable that appears in the GMM instrument 
set is the lag of the dependent variable. However, since these independent variables 
are very likely to suffer from an endogeneity problem, we re-estimate the model by 
including all the regressors in the GMM instrument set for last two regressions. 
Regression (4) takes the heteroskedasticity assumption into consideration.  
 
Table 3. The Lagged Impact of the Sudden Stop on Output Growth, Difference GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged SS -1.744** 
(0.721) 
-1.602** 
(0.726) 
-1.946*** 
(0.713) 
-1.946** 
(0. 560) 
Lagged GDPgrowth 0.089* 
(0.050) 
0.090* 
(0.050) 
0.105** 
(0.050) 
0.105*** 
(0.045) 
DGOVConGDP -0.207 
(0.227) 
-0.198 
(0.226) 
-0.264 
(0.224) 
-0.264 
(0.220) 
DHumanCapital 0.035 
(0.076) 
0.030 
(0.076) 
0.038 
(0.076) 
0.712 
(0.082) 
DinvestmentGDP 0.730*** 
(0.056) 
0.731*** 
(0.056) 
0.712*** 
(0.055) 
0.712*** 
(0.082) 
Observations 212 212 212 212 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.041 0.058 0.085 0.085 
1st order serial correlation(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
2nd order serial correlation(p-value) 0.209 0.199 0.242 0.151 
Note: Dependent variable is the GDP. Equation 1 is estimated with difference GMM with only lagged 
GDP growth as a GMM estimator. Equation 2 is estimated with difference GMM with lagged sudden 
stops and lagged GDP growth as GMM estimators. Equation 3 estimated with difference GMM with 
all variables as GMM estimators. Column 4: Robust Standard Errors with all as GMM estimators. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
As the results of Table 3 suggest, the impact of sudden stops in the result is 
statistically significant with the negative sign as expected, and the variation of 
coefficients is small. The lagged dependent variable is positively correlated with 
current value and it is statistically significant. Investment is significant and has 
positive effect on GDP growth.  The Arrelano-Bond test does not support a 
rejection of the serial correlation of order 1 but does support a rejection of serial 
correlation of orders 2 in all cases. However the Sargan test indicates that the 
instruments variables are not passable in the first equation and are barely passable 
in the latter three cases. 
Another way of implementing GMM to dynamic panel data models is to include 
not only the lags of differences, but also the levels of dependent variable as 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 5(4), N. Emara, C. Ni, & Y. Gao, p.328-337. 
333 
instruments. Same as difference GMM, we here assume that serial correlation of 
differenced error is limited to one lag.  
 
Table 4.  The Lagged Impact of the Sudden Stop on Output Growth, System GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged SS -1.453** 
(0. 737) 
-1.434** 
(0. 555) 
-1.434* 
(0. 737) 
-1.434** 
(0. 555) 
Lagged GDPgrowth 0. 288*** 
(0.046) 
0. 288*** 
(0.046) 
0. 288*** 
(0.054) 
0. 288*** 
(0.054) 
DGOVConGDP -0.219 
(0.244) 
-0.204 
(0.214) 
-0.204 
(0.214) 
-0.204 
(0.214) 
DHumanCapital -0.002 
(0.080) 
-0.011 
(0.079) 
-0.011 
(0.106) 
-0.011 
(0.106) 
DinvestmentGDP 0.729*** 
(0.061) 
0.727*** 
(0.060) 
0.727*** 
(0.085) 
0.727*** 
(0.085) 
Observations 240 240 240 240 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.061 0.058 0.144 0.144 
1st order serial correlation(p-value) . 0.000 0.000 0.002 
2nd order serial correlation(p-value) 0.216 0.199 0.203 0.146 
Note: Dependent variable is the GDP. Equation 1 estimated with system GMM with only lagged 
GDPgrowth as the GMM estimator. Equation 2 estimated with system GMM with lagged sudden 
stops and lagged GDPgrowth as GMM estimators. Equation 3 estimated with system GMM with all 
variables as GMM estimators. Column 4: Robust Standard Errors with all as GMM estimators. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
With system GMM, the lagged sudden stops negatively affects output. Table 4 
shows thatin the year following a sudden stops, output growth decreases by around 
1.4%, ceteris paribus. In the last two equations, Sargan test results show that the 
instruments are acceptable at all conventional levels. Therefore, the model and 
over-identifying conditions are correctly specified. Again, the Arrelano Bond test 
confirms a serial correlation of order 1, but no serial correlation of order 2 or 
beyond. Lagged GDP growth is statistically significant across the equations and so 
is the investment ratio. However, government expenditure and human capital are 
not statistically significant. 
Next, we employ the same approach we used above to test the impact on 
investment. Table 5 presents the results. The set of control variables to be chosen 
here are lagged GDP growth, interest rate, foreign direct investment, and debt 
service to GDP ratio.  
 
Table 5.  The Lagged Impact of the Sudden Stop on Investment, Difference, and System 
GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged SS -1.984 
(1.348) 
-2.372*** 
(0.857) 
-2.372* 
(1.246) 
-2.372* 
(1.246) 
Lagged investment 0.592*** 
(0.072) 
0.667*** 
(0.048) 
0.667*** 
(0.047) 
0.667*** 
(0.047) 
Lagged GDPgrowth 0.396*** 
(0.071) 
0.385*** 
(0.072) 
0.385*** 
(0.069) 
0.385*** 
(0.069) 
InterestRate 0.047 
(0.042) 
0.031 
(0.020) 
0.031 
(0.028) 
0.031 
(0.028) 
FDIGDP 0.398 
(0.303) 
0.268* 
(0.153) 
0.268 
(0.221) 
0.268 
(0.221) 
debtserviceGDP -0.008 
(0.031) 
-0.047* 
(0.025) 
-0.047** 
(0.021) 
-0.047** 
(0.021) 
Observations 138 146 146 146 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.196 0.403 0.403 0.403 
1st order serial correlation(p-value) 0.015 . 0.017 0.017 
2nd order serial correlation(p-value) 0.272 0.000 0.241 0.241 
Note: Dependent variable is investment to GDP ratio. Equation 1 is estimated with difference GMM 
while treating all variables as endogenous. Equation 2 and 3 used system GMM with normal and 
robust standard error and all variables are treated as strictly exogenous. Last estimation used same 
methodology with heteroscedasticity-robust standard error and all regressors are in GMM instrument 
set. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%. 
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The logic behind this is as follows: lagged output growth usually has a positive 
correlation with future investment. But investment is negatively correlated with 
interest rate and debt service in a certain country, as these will impose additional 
costs on enterprises’ investment. FDI, on the other hand, tends to incentivize 
domestic investment, especially along the value chain. With these theories and 
empirical evidence in mind, we begin our analysis of impact on investment with 
running GMM technique by using lagged investment as one of the model’s 
regressors. 
The results of Table 5 show that the sudden stops have a lagging effect on 
investment. The year after a country suffers from a sudden stop, the investment to 
GDP ratio will fall by 2.372 percentage points, holding everything else constant. 
Lagged investment and lagged GDP growth both have a positive impact on 
investment in the current period at 1% statistical significance. Holding others 
constant, one percentage increase in the prior year’s investment tends to increase 
investment to GDP ratio by 0.667 percent. And one percentage increase in the prior 
year GDP will increase the investment to GDP ratio by 0.385 percent. Sargan tests 
all show that models and over-identifying conditions are correctly specified. 
Arrelano-Bond tests all state that first order but not second order serial correlation 
exists, except for the second equation. The outcome in system GMM is consistent 
with the literature and shows sudden stops tend to have an adverse effect on 
domestic investment. 
 
5. Robustness check 
Asian economies have structural difference compared to countries in Latin 
America, including higher savings rate, better current account balance, etc. (Calvo, 
Izquierdo, & Meijia, 2004), and sudden stops may have various effect on the two 
regions. Therefore, we set up the Asian Group including Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, South Korea and Thailand; and Latin American Group including 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela. 
The results of Table 6 shows that the impact of lagged sudden stops is 
statistically significant in most cases and is negative, as concluded above. It also 
shows that sudden stops affect Asian countries more severely than Latin American 
countries. As Calvo, Izquierdo, & Meijia (2004) explain, the higher saving rates, 
better current account balances, and stronger macroeconomic fundamentals in 
Latin America produce this effect.  
 
Table 6. Robustness Check for Impact on Output Across Regions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Asian 
Countries 
Latin American 
Countries 
  
 
Fixed 
effects System GMM 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Lagged SS -1.812 
(1.577) 
-2.638* 
(1.463) 
-1.771** 
(0.449) 
-0.388* 
(0. 701) 
Lagged GDPgrowth 
. 
0.375*** 
(0.108) . 
0. 155** 
(0.080) 
DGOVConGDP -0.818 
(0.399) 
-0.576 
(0.372) 
0.173 
(0.190) 
0.055 
(0.254) 
DHumanCapital -0.301** 
(0.083) 
-0.236*** 
(0.065) 
0.041 
(0.111) 
0.024 
(0.116) 
DinvestmentGDP 0.705*** 
(0.092) 
0.621*** 
(0.060) 
0.716** 
(0.188) 
0.739*** 
(0.174) 
Observations 112 112 93 93 
Sargan test (p-value) . 0.262 . 0.117 
1st order serial correlation(p-value) . 0.046 . 0.029 
2nd order serial correlation(p-value) . 0.671 . 0.087 
R2  (overall) 0.486 . 0.366 . 
Note: All have robust standard error. Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, 
Thailand. Latin American countries: Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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The occurrence of sudden stops affect Asian countries by a decrease of 2.638 
percent in output, while they affect Latin American countries by a decrease of 
0.388 percent, holding everything else constant. The investment to GDP ratio is 
very robust and the magnitude is quite similar between the two regions. Both 
Sargan tests in system GMM indicate that the model is correctly specified. Results 
of the serial correlation are as expected in the model for Asian countries. 
We then checked the robustness of result on investment across regions. As the 
results of Table 7 shows, the impact of sudden stops in lagged term has no 
statistically significant impact on Asian countries’ investments in either the fixed 
effects or the system GMM models. For Latin American countries, the impact is 
negative and is statistically significant at a 5% level. However, a postestimation 
test shows that the instruments used in a system GMM are not exogenous. 
 
Table 7. Robustness Check for Impact on Investment Across Regions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Asian 
Countries 
Latin American 
Countries 
  
 
Fixed 
effects System GMM 
Fixed 
effects 
System 
GMM 
Lagged SS 0.203 
(2.120) 
-1.981 
(2.221) 
-2.083 
(1.211) 
-1.916** 
(0.827) 
Lagged investment 
. 
0.610*** 
(0.079) . 
0. 486*** 
(0.134) 
Lagged GDPgrowth 1.024*** 
(0.048) 
0.589*** 
(0.046) 
0.254** 
(0.077) 
0.152*** 
(0.043) 
InterestRate 0.245 
(0.133) 
0.222*** 
(0.031) 
0.016 
(0.055) 
0.018 
(0.018) 
FDIGDP 0.585 
(0.467) 
0.198 
(0.274) 
0.570 
(0.437) 
0.316 
(0.345) 
debtserviceGDP -0.080 
(0.187) 
-0.035 
(0.052) 
0.043 
(0.153) 
-0.021 
(0.030) 
Observations 85 85 61 61 
Sargan test (p-value) . 0.406 . 0.075 
1st order serial correlation(p-value) . 0.094 . 0.106 
2nd order serial correlation(p-value) . 0.119 . 0.369 
R2  (overall) 0.624 . 0.154 . 
 
Table 8. Robustness Check for Impact on Output Incorporating New Control Variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged SS -1.434** 
(0. 555) 
-1.349*** 
(0. 476) 
-1.589*** 
(0.529) 
-1.019* 
(0.610) 
Lagged GDPgrowth 0. 288*** 
(0.054) 
0. 263*** 
(0.056) 
0. 266*** 
(0.615) 
0. 215*** 
(0.071) 
DGOVConGDP -0.204 
(0.214) 
-0.236 
(0.205) 
-0.188 
(0.208) 
-0.318 
(0.216) 
DHumanCapital -0.011 
(0.106) 
-0.033 
(0.112) 
-0.000 
(0.097) 
-0.214*** 
(0.075) 
DinvestmentGDP 0.727*** 
(0.085) 
0.718*** 
(0.086) 
0.729*** 
(0.085) 
0.640*** 
(0.068) 
Inflation 
 
-0.014 
(0.010)   
TradeGDP 
  
0.014*** 
(0.003)  
STdebtratio 
   
0.167*** 
(0.033) 
Observations 240 240 240 193 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.144 0.093 0.177 0.062 
1st order serial correlation(p-value) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 
2nd order serial correlation(p-value) 0.146 0.139 0.163 0.086 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Note: Dependent variable is the GDP. All estimations are made by system GMM with 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard error. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Lastly, in Table 8 we run another set of robustness check by adding new control 
variables and find out how sensitive the variable of lagged sudden stops is to these 
changes. Since no obvious and robust results support our hypothesis that lagged 
sudden stops have a strong negative impact on current investment, we will focus on 
the robustness of impact on output. 
As the results of Table 8 shows, the impact remains negative and statistically 
significant. Adding new variables did not alter the magnitude dramatically from the 
baselines, as shown in model 1 in the first column. Post-estimation tests all have 
the expected results. All new control variables are statistically significant except 
for the inflation variable, which suggest that its variability over the period of our 
study does not have a major impact on output. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation methodology we 
analyze the impact of sudden stops on macroeconomic indicators of economic 
growth and investment. The results suggest that sudden stops have negative impact 
on both output growth and investment. In the regressions for output, when current 
sudden stops variable is added to the regression, the R-square is too small or the 
coefficient of sudden stops is statistically insignificant, due to different control 
variables. This implies that sudden stops may have lagging effect. By using lagged 
sudden stops instead of current sudden stops, we show that the lagged sudden stops 
have a negative coefficient which is statistically significant, no matter how the 
control variables change. Employing difference and system GMM estimations 
shows that the lagged sudden stops is also statistically significant and has a 
negative coefficient. These results support our hypothesis that sudden stops have 
negative and lagging effect on output. 
The variable growth of investment to GDP ratio has an important role in 
explaining the model, and is statistically significant in all the regressions while 
other control variables are statistically insignificant. When the growth of 
investment to GDP ratio is added to the regression, R-square improves 
significantly. This indicates that investment plays a role in the impact of sudden 
stops on economic activities, which supplies a reason the current study is 
meaningful. 
We perform robustness checks in two ways. Since Asian and Latin American 
economies differ structurally in terms of savings rate, fiscal balance, etc. (Calvo, 
Izquierdo, & Meijia 2004), sudden stops may have differing effects in the two 
regions. Therefore, we distinguish the Asian Group, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand from the Latin American Group, 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela by adding a regional dummy 
variable to the regression. This test excludes Hungary and Turkey. The other 
robustness check consists of adding additional control variables into the regression. 
The results show that sudden stops affect the output of Asian countries more 
severely than the output of Latin American countries. Adding other control 
variables such as inflation, trade (% of GDP), and short-term debt (% of total 
external debt) shows that the impact of sudden stops on output is robust. By 
contrast, the impact of sudden stops on investment is not statistically significant in 
Asian countries and is only statistically significant in GMM estimation in Latin 
American countries.  
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